Edward Wilson Ammerman, by His Guardian Ad Litem, La Verne Bruce Ammerman, and Eddie Soliz v. Farmers Insurance Exchange : Appellant\u27s Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1967
Edward Wilson Ammerman, by His Guardian Ad
Litem, La Verne Bruce Ammerman, and Eddie
Soliz v. Farmers Insurance Exchange : Appellant's
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Don J. Hanson; Attorney for AppellantKipp and Charlier; Attorneys for Respondent
AmmermanReed H. Richards; Attorney for Respondent Ammerman
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance, No. 10574 (Utah Supreme Court, 1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/17
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ED\V ARD WILSON AMMER-
MAN, by his Guardian ad 
Li tern, La Verne Bruce Ammer-
man, and EDDIE SOLIZ, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
VS. 
FARMERS INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10,574 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ., Of: UTAH 
Appeal from the Judgment of the J~11< 1 J 1967 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge '., .,"-~-~ IT'.'._:\~)" 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Kipp & Charlier 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
.. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ST A TE ME NT OF CASE ______________ ___________ _____________________ 1 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF 
FACTS ----------------------------------------- ______________ ______________ 2 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II ____________________ 3 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT III ________________ 10 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT IV ________________ 11 
CASES CITED 
Automobile Mutual Indemnity Company v. Shaw, 134 
Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 ( 1938) ------------------------------------ 3 
Bluebird Taxi Corporation vs. American Fidelity and 
Casualty Company, 26 F. Supp. 808 (D.C.S.C.) _____ _4, 9, 
Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 134 Atl. 
(2d) 223 Penn. (1957) -------------------------------------------- 6 
Paul v. Kirkendall, Utah 6 (2d) 256, 311 Pac. (2d) 376 13 
Tabben v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 250 F. 
Supp. 853 ( 1966) -------------------------------------------------------- 12 
Tiger River Pipe Company v. Maryland Casualty Com-
pany, 163 S.C. 229, 161 S.E. 491 (1931) ---------------- 4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD WILSON AMMER-
MAN, by his Guardian ad 
Li tern, La Verne Bruce Ammer-
man, and EDDIE SOLIZ, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10,574 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs-Re-
spondents to recover from the Defendant-Appellant 
insurance company the amount of a prior judgment 
in excess of the policy limits contracted for by the 
insured, Ammerman. The Appellant has submitted 
a Brief in this appeal and now replies to Respon-
dent's Brief. 
No statement of facts will be attempted here 
since it would be merely repetitive of Appellant's 
first Brief. 
It is Appellant's purpose by this brief to point 
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out the errors in Respondents' Brief which bear 
materially upon the issues in the case. In reply Ap-
pellant, therefore, respectfully submits the follow-
ing: 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT 
OF FACTS 
Appellant first wishes to point out that through-
out Respondents' Statement Of Fads they continue 
to do what was attempted throughout the trial of 
this action, i.e. a retrial of the first case by focusing 
attention on the details of Soliz's alleged injuries 
rather than directing their inquiry towards facts 
evidencing bad faith by the Defendant. In the State-
ment Of Facts on page 4 of Respondents' Brief, 
Soliz's trial testimony concerning his injuries is 
quoted at length notwithstanding the fact that 
the transcript of the prior trial was never 
presented in the trial of the present action, 
although it was submitted for evidence to 
the pre-trial judge. In this and many other in-
stances throughout Respondents' Brief an attempt 
is made to present evidence not submitted to the jury 
in the trial of this action. On pages 21 and 22 of 
their Brief Respondents cite the transcript of the 
previous case to show that Appellant's counsel had 
consented to a finding of negligence as a matter of 
law. However, this also was not presented as evi-
dence in the trial of this matter, and merely clouds 
the true issue in this case - whether the verdict of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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bad faith was supported by any clear and convinc-
ing evidence of bad faith. The Respondents' facts 
and arguments are directed to the proposition that 
if the verdict in the previous case was supportable 
by the evidence Appellant is ipso facto guilty of bad 
faith for not settling within the policy limits. Of 
course, this is not the inquiry nor the correct rule 
of law in this action. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II. 
Respondents begin their argument in support 
of the verdict by citing an instruction of the trial 
court which defined bad faith as constituting not 
a mistake of judgment but rather an "interested 
or sinister motive", but then paradoxically Respon-
dents proceed to argue that the test of bad faith 
is negligence and that the verdict here is thus cor-
ectly founded thereon. Respondents cite on page 19 
the case of Aittomobile Miliual Indemnity Company 
v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938) for the 
proposition that the test of bad faith is what a man 
of ordinary care and prudence would do. This is 
misleading for that case, on a careful reading, estab-
lishes a contrary rule. On page 859 of the opinion 
the court pointed out by reference to another case 
that a verdict of bad faith cannot be supported upon 
a theory of negligence, (Emphasis ours) or implied 
contract, but must be bottomed on a finding of bad 
faith which the Court defined as a decision to reject 
an offer of settlement without honest or intelligent 
3 
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consideration. The Court i·ecognized; however, that a 
factor in bad faith could be negligent investigation of 
the facts in the case. In the present action even Tel 
Charlier, counsel for Respondent Soliz, admitted that 
Appellant had through its investigation acquired 
all the evidence as to injuries, losses and expenses 
that was known to exist ( R 320). Thus a claim now 
of negligent investigation is refuted by the testi-
mony of Respondents' own counsel. Thus the case 
really stands for the proposition which has been ac-
cepted by the great majority of courts and impliedly 
by Utah - that bad faith is not negligence, but 
rather is a dishonest or fraudulent refusal to settle 
within the policy limits. 
Respondents' citation of Tiger Rii,er Pipe Com-
pany v. Maryland Casualty Company, 163 S.C. 229, 
161 S.E. 491 ( 1931) on page 18 of their brief is 
also misleading as to the issue of duty. Appellant 
conceded in its first Brief that the fairest rule for 
all concerned was that the insurer owed a duty of 
equal consideration to itself and its insureds. Iron-
ically Respondents appear to take issue with this, 
and in doing so cite the only case known by Appel-
lan t to exist where a court has pronounced the duty 
of the insurer to be that of sacrificing its own in-
terest in favor of the insured. This is absurd, and 
seems to have no place in this case except to further 
confuse the issues on appeal. It is interesting to note 
that subsequent to that case a Federal District Court 
in South Carolina, in the case of Bluebird Taxi Co;·-
4 
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porotion v. Anierican Fidelity And Casualty Com-
pany, 26 F. Supp. 808 (D.C.S.C.) approved a direct-
ed verdict for an insurer in a bad faith case largely 
on the testimony of two defense lawyers as expert 
witnesses, and in so doing disapproved the test 
stated in the Tiger River case, supra, because it 
would result in fraud and def eat the effectiveness 
and purpose of insurance. 
In Point II Respondents mix together all the 
theories as to duty and standard of care and come 
up with no test. This appears to be an effort to 
provide an exnansive and undefined runway upon 
which to land their verdict. Respondents' position 
appears to be that by adding inference upon infer-
en~e and insinuation upon insinuation the appari-
tion of bad faith will suddenly appear. This Res-
pondents do in their application of the facts. Some 
examples are: 
On page 24, where it is said that it could 
be inferred that the activity check was not 
introduced because it was disastrous to the 
insurer and thus showed bad faith (despite 
the complete lack of evidence as to the content 
and relevancy of the check) . 
On page 25, where Respondents infer bad 
faith from the faet that the Company's ini-
tial offer was $4,500.00 and not the $6,000.00 
value given the case by defendant's counsel 
conditioned upon an independent medical ex-
-5 
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amination being performed. 
On page 23, where Respondents infer 
bad faith because Dr. Bernson was unequiY-
ocal and Dr. Clegg was not so unequivocal (de-
spite testimony by one expert that unequivocal 
statements by a doctor in reference to a spinal 
disc, made without benefit of an operation, 
are suspect ( R. 343, Tr. 209) ) . 
On page 22 Respondents raise an infer-
ence of support for their position from the 
testimony of Soliz's wife in the first action, 
which testimony was not presented as evidence 
in the trial of the present action. 
What all this amounts to is an attempt to base 
a verdict of bad faith on weak and even non-exist-
ent inferences instead of on clear and convincing 
evidence of dishonesty. This requirement is made 
clear in the case of Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co., 134 Atl. (2d) 223 Penn. (1957) where 
the court affirmed a directed verdict in defendant's 
favor on the ground that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to go to the jury. There the plaintiff tried to 
prove bad faith by showing that a prior trial re-
sulted in a judgment for $100,000.00, although a 
new trial was subsequently granted; on retrial the 
insured requested settlement for $45,000.00 (which 
was $20,000.00 over the policy limits) with the in-
sured offering to pay $10,000.00 of that sum; letters 
in reference to the offer sent to the insurer during 
6 
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the trial were not answered; and insurer's counsel 
allegedly said that his job was to try cases, not 
to settle them. The defendant was counting on a 
"no cause of action" based on the lack of proximate 
cause. The judgment, however, was for $90,000.00 
and was upheld on appeal. 
In the ensuing bad faith action the trial court 
directed a verdict against the plaintiffs for insuffi-
cient evidence. The court, in affirming, said: 
"The appellant, however, appears to be 
wholly unmindful of the law's requirement 
that bad faith must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence and not merely insinu-
ated. As the late Judge Columbus, who was 
the trial judge in the instant case, sagely ob-
served in the opinion for the Court in Banc, 
'the adversity encountered by Cowden has the 
unfortunate tendency to obscure, magnify and 
distort out of proportion the behavior and ac-
tion of the defendant and its agents in de-
fending the Philips claim. The jury's verdict 
confirmed the fears of Cowden and his pri·.1 -
ate counsel and verified the basis of their con-
cern as expressed in letters sent to Schmidt 
(counsel for insurer). However, it does not 
of itself lend substance to the charge of bad 
faith, proof of which is essential to the plain-
tiff's recovery. It is merely proof that the re-
sults of Saturday's contest are more certainly 
stated on the following Monday than they are 
.... predictable on the preceding Friday ... ' 
A number of instances are cited by the Appel-
lant, the cumulative effect whereof proves, as 
he contends, that the defendant was guilty of 
bad faith in its handling of the Philips claim. 
7 
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Neither separately no1· together do the mat-
ters which the Appellant thus cites constitute 
any proof of bad faith on the part of the de-
fendant ... ". (Emphasis ours) 
As to the statement by the defendant's counsel 
that his job was to try cases, not to settle them, the 
court said: 
" ... but accepting fo1· present pm·poses 
. that it was said just as Cowden related, still 
it was not inconsistent with the bona fide de-
cision that the defendant by trial, had a good 
chance of relieving Cowden, as well as itself, 
from liability. Was the defendant required to 
pay out $25,000 of its own money in order 
to compensate for Cowden's failure to carry 
adequate insurance . . . " (Supra, at 229) 
The position of the Respondents here is no dif-
ferent essentially from the plaintiff in that case. 
Not only do the Respondents rely upon insinu-
ations and inferences, but they also misconceive the 
question at issue here. The issue is whether or not 
the defendant acted in bad faith in not settling for 
$9,000.00 before trial and $10,000.00 during trial. 
Yet Respondents on page 25 of their Brief attempt 
to frame the issue around Appellant's failure to offer 
its full tentative settlement evaluation in response 
to Respondents' initial offer of $9,000.00. In other 
words, Resepondents now allege that Appellant was 
guilty of bad faith in refusing to offer $6,000.00 
despite the fact that the evidence shows that the 
$6,000.00 value arrived at by counsel for the de-
8 
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fendant was conditioned upon the obtaining of an in-
clependant medical examination, and despite the fact 
that Respondents made no further effort to negotiate 
a reasonable settlement by offering less than the ori-
ginal $9,000.00. The respondents a1·e advocating an 
apprnach condemned in the previously cited Blue-
bird Taxi case, supra, whe1·e the court warned 
against proteding only the insured's interest since 
it would enable the plaintiffs to make one offer 
which would probably not be accepted and then, in 
collaboration with the insured, sue for the excess, 
if any, on the theory that the insurer acted in bad 
faith in not offering its full value in immediate 
response to the plaintiff's initial offer. 
Respondents also err on page 27 in stating as 
a proposition of law that bad faith is shown if the 
insm·er knew the jury "might" bring back a ver-
dict in excess of the limits. This is clearly contrary 
to reason and to the law applied in bad faith cases, 
since a jury "might" do anything, thus making all 
defenses "bad faith" cases if an excess verdict oc-
curs. Even the Respondents should hesitate to ad-
vocate such a test for bad faith. 
The issue in t};.is appeal is whether there was 
clear and convincing evidence showing that the de-
cision of the Appellant was dishonest or fraudulent 
in that it knew the jury could be reasonably expected 
to bring back a verdict in excess of the policy limits. 
The plethora of inferences and insinuations present-
9 
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ed at trial and now argued by the Respondents in 
their Brief fail to satisfy this test, for at most they 
only show that in retrospect the facts, interpreted 
in favor of the Respondents, are sufficient to sup-
port a verdict in the first action in Soliz' favor. The 
lack of facts indicating a dishonest evaluation is 
obvious. However, the facts showing an honest and 
reasonable evaluation are numerous. Even Respon-
dents' expert witness, Louis Medgley, placed the 
settlement value at $7,500.00 (R. 238). 
The Respondents in the trial of this action and 
in their Brief have failed to present any clear and 
convincing evidence of bad faith, but merely 
show by inferences and insinuations that in truth 
the results of Saturday's contest are more certainly 
stated on the following Monday than they are pre-
dictable on the preceding Friday. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT III 
Respondents in their Point III confuse the at-
torney-client privilege involved in this case with 
situations where such relationship does not exist. 
On page 30 of Respondents' Brief the case therein 
cited deals not with the insurance company and 
its counsel but rather with the insurance company 
and the State Insurance Department - clearly a 
different situation and one not calling for a privi-
lege. Respondents also on page 30 of their Brief dis-
cuss the right of the client to waive that privilege. 
Appellant agrees that the client may waive the pri-
10 
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vilege, but in the present case the client was the def-
fendant insurance company which did not waive 
the privilege and, therefore, no exception applies. 
The additional cases cited in Point III of Re-
spondents' Brief can be distinguished from the pre-
sent situation since in those cases the insured was 
not represented personally by other counsel but 
rather relied wholly upon the insurance company's 
counsel and in effect adopted said counsel as their 
own. Appellant does not contend that the insurance 
company's general file is not to be made available 
in such cases; however, Appellant does contend 
that under a situation such as that now presented 
where the insured has his own counsel and the ma-
terials to be dis-:overed are confidential communic2-
tions between the insurance company and its counsel 
no exception does exist to the attorney-client privi-
lege regardless of the materiality of the matter. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT IV. 
Respondents appear to have missed the point 
in their argument under designated Point IV. Ap-
pellant readily agrees with Respondents that under 
the terms of the insurance contract issued by Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange to Edward Wilson Ammer-
man a right of action against the company for the 
policy amount is afforded those who recover a judg-
ment. No one disputes that principle of law, but the 
issue here is whether or not the judgment creditor 
may bring a tort action for the excess above the 
11 
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policy limits against the insurance company on a 
violation of a duty owed to the insured, Edward 
Wilson Ammennan. Respondents have failed to dis-
cern the dividing line between the cases on this mat-
ter as pointed out in Appellant's first Brief. It has 
been held that where the policy expressly gives the 
judgment creditor all of the rights belonging to the 
insured the judgment creditor is a proper party 
in a bad faith action because the full rights of thr 
insured have been assigned by the policy to the 
judgment creditor. However, it has been uniformly 
held that where the insurance policy merely gives 
the judgment creditor a right of action under the 
policy this is limited to a direct suit against the in-
surance company to collect the policy amount, and 
in no way assigns the collateral personal rights of 
the insured to the judgment creditor. In a very re-
cent case, Tabben v. Ohio Casualty Insurance C01n-
pany, 250 F. Supp. 853 (1966) the court dismissed 
the complaint of the judgment creditor on the ground 
that no legal injury was incurred by the judgment 
creditor because no duty was owed to him by the 
insurer, and no actual injury occurred since the 
judgment creditor received by the judgment more 
than he would have by the settlement. The cases 
cited by Respondents in their Brief to support their 
proposition all contain policy provisions assigning 
to the judgment creditor by the policy all of the 
rights possessed by the insured. Respondents do not 
cite any cases wherein the judgment creditor is al-
12 
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lowed to bring suit on bad faith under a policy such 
as that issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange 
which allows the judgment creditor to sue subject to 
the terms and limitations of the policy for the 
amount of the judgment. It seems clear that Soliz's 
presence in this lawsuit was prejudicial to a fair 
determination of the issue of bad faith by creating 
an appearance to the jury that the plaintiff Soliz 
was merely re-trying the original case in order to 
collect the remainder of the judgment. Moreover, 
the court further compounded this error by giving 
the judgment creditor a judgment for the excess 
over the policy limits, which is clearly error and con-
trary to the authorities in this area construing the 
rights of the judgment creditor, including the an-
alagous case of Paul v. Kirkendall decided by this 
court at 6 Utah (2d) 256, 311 Pac. (2d) 376. 
Appellant therefore respectfully submits that 
the record of this case and the Brief of Respondents 
fail to sustain the verdict rendered by the jury and 
instead the record clearly shows, as does the inde-
cisiveness of Respondents' Brief, that there was not 
any clear and convincing evidence of bad faith by 
defendant in failing to settle for $9,000.00 before 
trial or $10,000.00 during trial; and that further 
prejudicial error was committed by allowing the 
13 
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plaintiff Soliz to prosecute the lawsuit and by allow-
ing in evidence a confidential communication be-
tween the insurance company and its counsel. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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